Topsy Turvey Cake Price

The housing sector and the crisis in Castellón (V)

The chicken or the egg

Perhaps the demonization

(sometimes deserved, but not always) the real estate sector (obviously, there have been scams or that property speculators are rampant in the industry to alter the prices to rise quickly have other entrepreneurs targeted real estate) has contributed to the search within the sector the main cause of the debacle that even today (and it seems that for a long time to come) is ongoing, much has been said of excess supply (the built sector much higher than demand could absorb theoretically) as the main cause of the housing crisis, and we should not minimize the fact that it was built at a rapid pace and, quite possibly, excessive.

But the truth is that the stock of unsold new homes is estimated in many studies (most alarmist), based on the projects endorsed by the Colleges of Builders, which in 2006 accounted for a whopping 865,561 homes build (an average of 72,130 homes per month), as seen in the first article of this series , new home sales and purchases peaked (since monthly data are available) in January 2007, with 33,480 homes new borne. Was constructed, therefore, at a rate in excess of 40,000 homes each month (more than 450,000 homes were without buyer querdarían each year to continue that pace) while these figures for 2006 were indeed exceptional (the figures in previous years were around 15,000 homes per month or over 200,000 annually), it is evident that with these figures, an adjustment was made in the tender.

The problem is that projects are no more visas than that project. Many of these projects would become sales, but many would never materialize, the figures for the certification of work completed and evidenced: the 8,112,724 houses planned since 1992, only 5,251,381 have materialized. Thus, the maximum housing built was reached in 2007, with 547,285 (an average of 45,607 homes per month, which is 12,127 more than the purchases that occurred in January 2007).

If we take the number of dwellings completed since January 2007 we see that according to the certifications are 1,434,102, while according to the visa (given that must elapse between 18 and 24 months until they completed the projects) would be 2319 530, the number of new homes transmitted from January 2007 is 901,285, so that the mismatch between supply and demand would take as either data, or from 1,418,245 to 532,817 homes. According calculations Ministry of Housing, the stock accumulated in 2009 (which includes calculation accumulated since 2004) would be 688,044 homes (34,366 for Castellón), more in line with data from the certificates to the visa (used regularly by certain ultra-liberal media such as Digital Freedom , as shown in this article, 2008 or it for this week ).

As also saw the second article of the series , housing prices have experienced falls new peak of 10.73% in the whole of Spain and 15.49% in Castellón, far below the 30% or the 40% are handled in certain circles, of course, stock figures experts who manage some and pace of current sales and construction, unsold new homes could not absorb up to elapse between 10 to 15 years making it clear that the price adjustment would be consistent with those figures or even higher. However, the figures housing stock based on the visa is unrealistic, so the expected price decline based on these data it is also true, as indeed seems to show the latest official figures on prices (see updating of data from this series of articles .)

Although current purchases figures are around the 225,000 new homes a year (about 19,000 households per month), in 2005 there were more than 430,000 purchases (about 36,000 per month) and it was not until 2008 when operations fell of the 300,000 annual; remember that the financial crisis erupted in August 2007 and the number of mortgages granted began to drop sharply (with declines of over 30% on-year) just this month, as shown in the graph below (in March 2008 almost 50,000 mortgages were granted less than in March 2007).

Is the decline in the number of purchases resulted from oversupply? In all likelihood, affected the decrease in the number of purchases in 2006 and 2007 (until the outbreak of the financial crisis inter-specific decreases were close to 10% in the number of mortgages granted), especially when reports began to appear speaking of price declines of up to 40% by the exorbitant theoretically of housing stock was being accumulated, those on-year declines in the number of purchases of between 10% and 20% were able to respond to the crisis within the real estate, but is difficult to explain the extension in time (This will be the fourth consecutive year of crisis in the sector) if we consider that at the time which had to start the recovery (sectoral crisis is difficult to find more than two years, so that by mid-2008 should have initiated a slight comeback that never came) was booming financial crisis.

Since the demand for housing needs of a funding source, and it was not available (in January 2009 were granted a 58% mortgage less-less-than 72,000 two years earlier), the reason for the stagnation and decrease in the number of purchase transactions from 2008 we have set nonexistent in demand (due to lack of funding due to the liquidity crisis in the financial sector), not only (or mainly) to the excess supply, it is not, therefore, a supply crisis in the housing sector what we're seeing at present, but a crisis of demand for the concatenation of the financial crisis to the crisis in the construction sector.

Should further lower prices for new housing and an oversupply? On a sectoral crisis, possibly be a solution to revive sales, but if there is demand for the existence of a parallel financial crisis, the variation in sales prices has no effect on the market since any appeal that might have on the demand-adjusted prices would be completely cut off by the apparent inability to access funding to carry out the sale transaction.

The average amount of mortgages will help us highlight the main contradiction of the theories that say that house prices have continued to fall, the decline in the average value of mortgages granted has come to 26.71% from its highest levels, while prices have fallen just over 10% (based on data covering the whole of Spain). May 2007 marks the point inflection in the number of mortgages as on the average, beginning in August the sharpest falls in both variables, what would be expected that the number of mortgages condedidas accompany the number of house sales and the average amount of mortgages to accompany sales prices of homes. But that's not what happened.

The number of purchases and then fell in 2006 and continued doing so in 2007, while the number of mortgages peaked until May 2007, totally unrelated to the sales figures of the construction sector, financial institutions continued to give more and more mortgages until, in May 2007, Lehman-Brothers and similar investors start to flee mortgage funds and lack of liquidity is beginning to show in the financial market. Starts this month, a slight decrease in the number and amount of mortgages granted, it would become a real setback since August, just after the announcement of the bankruptcy of U.S. Blackstone, American Home Mortgage and National City Home Equity and the German bank IKB and after the subsequent while urgent multibillion-dollar, coordinated liquidity injections the Fed, the European Central Bank, the Bank of Canada and Bank of Japan. However, the sharp decline in the number of mortgages granted (58% from May 2007) is nearly equal to the decrease in the number of purchases (a 53.16%), having matched approximately two variables, although the pace of the fall has been very uneven (much more pronounced in number of mortgages that later collapsed and whose fall has been much higher).

With these data in hand, it is safe to say that housing prices have to go down, since currently the sector's main problem is excess supply, but that this is a common problem the rest of the economy: the financial sector provides loans and, therefore, demand does not exist. This being the main problem, of falling prices in the construction sector would be effective only if it reached a level that buyers do not need a loan to buy a home, as this is completely unworkable, the theoretical reductions in prices housing will continue to be minimal (in fact, prices are starting to pick up), since development companies know that demand will not be able to deliver (the number of mortgages granted by the financial sector is at levels lower than 2003) for much lower prices.

addition, if we add the data the average amount of mortgages Condec (which rose from 152,481.96 € in August 2007 to € 111,753.36 in August 2009, which represents a drop of almost 30%) can come to understand the current behavior of the application: they can only access a mortgage who have a particular capacity savings, so that the few mortgages that are granted are as borrowers who do not need funding beyond 60% or 70% of the price of each home or in any case, the immediate economic future is not going to see obscured by market circumstances.

So while home prices have been adjusted only 10% in four years of housing crisis data from the financial crisis (a decline of almost 30% in the average amount of mortgages and 70% in the total amount awarded, over 18,000 million euros a month awarded in January 2007 has been less than 6,000 million euros-) completely put into question the theories that argue about the only valid option supply crisis in the construction industry, when there is a crisis actually galloping demand due to financial sector crisis.

In short, we can point to the egg (excess supply) as an initial source of the real estate crisis, but we can not keep pointing to the egg from the moment the hen (The lack of demand by the lack of funding for the purchase) appears as a clear and dominant player in the current situation of the construction sector.

How Long Does It Take Diazepam To Work On My Dog

Labour policies ultraliberal figures

The ultra-liberalism advocates the abolition of the state practice and therefore to a minimum reduction of taxes on labor relations, according to this current, becoming increasingly widespread among English and European right, the current policies State labor are an intervention in the markets that hurts both the employee and the employer, which would largely benefit from zero intervention policies.

that a worker can be benefited with the ultra-liberal policies is a lot to say, but let's give him the benefit of the doubt on this theory, so we're going to put to numbers, of course, if it is beneficial for all parties will start from the premise that the worker, at least, will keep their lives on the same level as other interventionist policies more .

The calculations take a salary of € 1,500 gross per month, with the 10% withholding income tax and 6% that goes to Social Security become some 1,250 € net, like Social Security There is no economic theories ultra-liberal and the state is at least 6% and 10% disappears is reduced to 1%, so the net salary of 1,485 becomes € per month. Mola, that of ultra-liberalism: on the snout, 235 € more per month to spend.

But that's not all, no. If we eliminate Social Security, the employer no longer has to pay the state the other part of my dues, which are another 30%: 450 € gross more to the worker. Go bargain. To charge € 1,250, our worker would receivable, with the application of ultra-liberal theories, € 1,930.50 a month (we have subtracted 1% of income tax to those new 450 €). An instantaneous raise € 680.50 or 54%!

Of course, this new salary will have to subtract some amounts if you want it to that worker, as happy as a lark with his new salary, maintaining levels of protection may be required now because the law provides otherwise.

begin with the severance pay, that ultra-liberal theories, of course, disappear, we will assume that the worker has made today one of the new permanent contracts and to correspond, therefore, compensation for 33 days year worked, which is 9.09% of gross monthly salary (1,500 €) or, which is, € 136.35. That amount is that the worker should be reserved in your account each month to the day he fired, could have a cushion equal to that now falls by law (remember that, as ultra-liberal theories, we all benefit from their actions), but nothing happens, it would still charging € 1794.15 (a 43.53% increase).

We will continue with the pension, which, of course, would have to be private (Social Security've charged us one step), suppose that our happy worker is 18, so even you are, as least 47 years of employment. If all goes well, you can enjoy your board (private) 20 years (assuming the life expectancy of 30 years are within the 85), so to enjoy a pension equal to your net pay (take the initial € 1,250) would need to spend € 638.30 month to their pension fund. And here are just estimates, because the salary of our worker would be left at € 1,155.85, which is € 94.15 less than that now charges 7.53% or less (which exceeds the salary reduction of 5 % officials for the crisis).

Here is a quick paragraph about pension plans, for an ultra-liberal would say that these investments are revalued over time and, therefore, the contribution would be lower, the reality, however, is very different: a pension plan can increase in value, but it can also depreciate. In fact, under present circumstances, both pension plans invested in bonds (which give interest rates below inflation) and those investing in equities (with the stock market free fall) are experiencing a continued devaluation , so the calculations would fall short and our worker would, at the end of their working lives, with a pension lower than we had expected.

However, further calculations would end up worker's salary, for example, we might ask who would pay the monthly bills of electricity, telephone, water, pension fund or mortgage of a worker on sick leave for a serious illness. Banks tend to offer insurance (about 25 € a month, so our worker's wages would fall to € 1,130.85) to cover a maximum of 12 months of payment of mortgage payments in these cases, but light, water or phone does not take anyone. The drugs are subsidized at 60% and that percentage would also leave the salary of our worker and full private medical care round the 60 € monthly, so that the salary be reduced below € 1,070.85 ...

But not only the system of health protection which we loaded with the application of ultra-liberal policies, we have lowered the income tax from 10% to 1% because the state has been in the bones and does not need much food , and that has its counterpart: the education of our children will be private and pay us in full. Our workers have to go saving you need for your child (or children) be trained, so let's make a calculation, with today's prices, which consist of education liberal (and private) school education (kindergarten) would cost about 16,000 €, basic (from 6 to 16) some 75,000 € and the secondary another 24,000 €. All bonuses working lives of our workers (180,000 €) plus those of your partner (assuming another 180,000 €) would cover the education of three children, in any case, education for each additional child (115,000 €) would be subtracted from your salary and your partner another 100 € per month each. Of course, neither we ask our children learning in college, because that would mean about 30,000 € for each child (about 30 € monthly salary of our worker and 30 € the salary of his partner.)

With these basic costs that would entail the application of ultra-liberal system is sufficient to verify that no win-win (our worker would get a minimum of 200 € less than a month without pay and bonuses), but is also We made a small trap (is that the ultra-liberals do to balance their books) in finding that the employer contributions to Social Security (450 € a month) will go to the worker's pocket, which is a very big, not because it is not unusual for the tax cuts are designed by companies to increase the wages of their workers, but they are the companies themselves are talking about reducing wages .

But is that the ultra-liberal anyway, following the orthodox economic theories, consider the rules of supply and demand throughout the remainder in a worker's wages start to be rectified by the labor market itself, so If the worker lost 200 € with the system changes, the market would eventually require the employer an equivalent increase in the wages of their workers. What does this mean? Well, if the employer now costs € 1,950 a worker (salary of 1,500 € gross over the 450 € of employer contributions to Social Security) with the application of ultra-liberal theories would force the market to allocate labor costs of 200 € would lose the employee, then supposing costs of up to 2,150 €. Thus we could say that neither workers nor employers would benefit from ultra-liberal economic system.

And the obvious question is ... if both the employer and the employee would end up losing, how is it possible that anyone still defends those theories? The answer is simple: markets have flaws, and one of them is the imbalance between the bargaining the employer and worker, as is the former that has a greater capacity to impose its conditions, the market would never regulate workers' losses, so the loser will always be the same: our first happy worker, who lost the 200 € we have calculated over the 450 € that the company would save by eliminating the employer contributions to Social Security.

Our first happy worker would see its previous checks of 1,250 € will become a real salary of 600 € with the application of ultra-liberal theories. What a bargain!

Tax Calculation Netherland

The real estate sector and the crisis in Castellón (IV)

Market

work

As we have seen in previous installments in this series (the first on the number of operations housing sales and the second on the developments price per square meter in both new buildings such as used), there is a high degree of rigidity (low responsiveness) in housing prices to a collapse in demand that occurred in 2006, what we see now is whether this rigidity in income is a structural feature of the sector or, by contrast, is merely an act of opportunity.

begin with the most striking feature of this sector, is the high seasonality in labor contracts, the National Statistics Institute not provide data disaggregated by provinces regarding the timing, but we serve the global data for the whole of Spain. Keep in mind that both the classic construction (details of which were already listed individually in the above statistics INE) and the promotion of commercial and real estate (APIs) have been integrated with the new NACE classification (National Code of Economic Activities) in the construction sector.

As shown in figure upper half of temporality in Spain was between 30% and 35% through the first quarter of 2008 (not dropped below 5 million workers to the second quarter of 2008), although it started to be in the bottom of this range from the first quarter of 2007 after having reached its maximum (34.59%) in the third quarter of 2006, though a temporary high compared with neighboring countries, the construction sector came to 56.98 % of temporality in the third quarter of 2006.

Since the third quarter of 2006 (when there were 5,661,400 workers on temporary contracts) to the first quarter of 2010 have disappeared 1,940,900 temporary contracts while unemployment has increased by 2,960,900 people (have entered the labor market other 1,346,200 people, have increased to 828,200 permanent contracts and the rest, another 500,000 lost jobs at non-corresponding wage-employed persons, employers, business ... -), only in the construction industry has gone 710,000 temporary jobs since it will hit its peak in absolute numbers (1,218,500 contracts in the second quarter of 2007) while unemployment has come to increase by more than 600,000 people (before the Plan-E and the decline of the working population 476,800 construction workers have stopped looking for work in the field or have gone to swell the bulging list of long-term unemployed, who are not assigned a specific sector, should give some respite to the terrifying figures of statistics).

Both the numbers of time as the unemployed (from the second quarter of 2007 the unemployment rate in building fires, both in Spain and, especially, in Castellón), we note that that rigid to adapt the sales prices of homes there is apparently no time to reduce labor costs, however, not forget that companies are promoting (the last link in the chain of costs) and not the building (that being the first link was the first time not to renew their contracts with the increasing inactivity of the sector, although it impacted their costs to the next link), which set up these prices, so that adjustments can hardly be immediate.

The labor market situation in Castellon real estate is much more critical than in the rest of Spain, to be the Castellon sector with a lower rate of unemployment (having just reached 1.64% in the second quarter of 2007 ) has come to break all known figures, coming in today to have an unemployment rate of 32.92%, although the figures of the sector in Spain are also triggered (5.50% rate of unemployment in the sector in the third quarter of 2005 has reached to 27.32% during the first quarter of 2009), the weight of the sector in Castellón province has made the pass to be one that best overall unemployment figures presented (usually two or three percentage points below the national average) to be one that presents an unemployment rate more runaway (over 26% today, almost five percentage points above the overall figures for Spain).

The importance of the construction sector in the province of Castellón can be observed in the last graph which shows how the relative weight (relative to total contract workers in all sectors) the number of employed in this activity was more than two to six points (reaching about 18% of all employed in the province ) the weight of the sector at national level (which was never assumed 14%), at present, the relative weight of the persons employed in the construction sector in the total of employed equaled down in Spain , Castellón, assuming now about 10% of employees. By contrast, the number of unemployed workers has risen from about 8% of total unemployment (both in Spain, Castellón, albeit with ups and downs in this case) to exceed 16% of relative weight, now accounting for between 12% and 14% of the total unemployed. Do not forget the contribution of this sector to GDP has been around 10% since 2005 (closer to 11% in 2006), but today is slightly lower (9.44% in the first quarter 2010).

In summary, the high rate of temporary employment in the construction sector has set the companies' labor costs through massive layoffs of workers (there is a temporary contract 58.27% less in the sector, having gone to swell the unemployment lists the 97.40% of workers with this type of contract, without forgetting that there is an indefinite contract 29.85% less), despite the low relative weight in the overall sector of the economy (10% of GDP and 12% of workers) The sector's contribution to the national increase in unemployment was 20% and the destruction of temporary jobs 37%, while in Castellón direct contribution to the increase in unemployment was 33% (the hint would be much greater, since the industrial sector, with ceramic head has been severely affected by the crisis in the construction). The long claimed (by employers' associations) labor market flexibility in construction sector is, therefore, very high, however, that flexibility in costs not reflected in a similar flexibility when addressing alterations in revenues, showing a little too stiff in line with market cost competitive (at least in the work).

The construction sector did not need, therefore, touches competitive in terms of employment structure (in any case, he needed was one more job stability, as evidenced by the high accident rate in the sector), on the contrary, that would have necessitated the construction itself would have been a company policy less speculative, less opportunistic and less rigid. The virulent correcting these deficiencies in corporate policies have had to come, unfortunately, as many bankruptcy proceedings, with the consequent impact, again, in the workplace.

We will see in the next installment of this series the origins of the collapse of the sector, the main reason not attributable to the excess supply (which also may have contributed to the crisis in the sector, though not in the key terms that appear to have been established between public opinion).

Methodological Note: The unemployment figures I have used include those seeking their first job (323,900 in Spain and 3,300 in Castellón in the last quarter), so that unemployment rates are slightly higher (between 1% and 1.5%) to officially recognized in the Labour Force Survey, which is the source from which you have data taken.

Update Data

How Much Calories Does Halal Food Have

The real estate sector and the crisis in Castellón (III) We

In October last year tried data housing sales and prices of them related to Spain and Castellón, on the number of domestic purchases, said that we were minimum housing both new and used (generally below the 40,000 monthly purchases under 20,000 in both types of viviedas), as in Castellón, although in this case with a more erratic behavior (taking into account that our province-year data showed the continuity of the crisis, albeit with a diminishing bleeding in purchases especially in new home).

prices showed, in Spain, Castellón, a lack of flexibility leading to changes in demand (the fall of sales transactions in 2006-much more pronounced in Castellón, down 41% compared to 10 % of the whole of Spain were not reflected in prices until the second and third quarter of 2008), also the year falls in prices (both new and used housing) until the third quarter of 2009 (fourth quarter data at the time) offered no expectations of improvement or to Castellon or the whole of Spain. As data to take into account, the price per square meter at the national level showed a strange parallel between the new and used housing, something that did not, as logic dictates, in Castellón.

The data shown in October last referred to the month of July 2009 and the third quarter of this year, while currently available data for the month and the first quarter and April 2010, so that before to continue with the series, I should update the data and discuss the most significant developments.

The number of house sales in Spain as a whole has remained more or less stable (between 32,000 and 40,000 transactions per month) with slight variations, as I said in October the three consecutive data upward (from May to July 2009) could not be taken too optimistically, as it departed from the lowest level of operations (the month of April did not reach the 30,000) of the entire series. And indeed, in August saw a further decline, although in the months following their oscillations because both upward and downward levels have been maintained, as I said earlier, within a certain stability. The number of purchases in any case, it is very similar (almost 50%) for both types of homes (new and used), also three consecutive falls to April 2010 can not be pessimistic sense now, as we will see in the charts for interannual variations.

erratic data that I mentioned in October is held in Castellon in the following months, so, of just over 200 new homes sold in December 2009 (the worst figure corresponds to December 2008, so this month seems to be the worst for sales transactions in Castellón) turn to the more than 700 in August 2009 or almost 500 of October, falling back to of just over 200 in March 2010. That same erratic behavior is found in the old housing, although less virulent falls and comebacks (since January 2008, operations in this type of housing have remained between 300 and 500 per month).

While still with some reservations (especially in the case of Castellón), interannual variations in operations sales seem to show a clear inflection in the trend, especially in the housing used (with five consecutive increases, the last three above 20%) still holds new housing declines, although interspersed with small rises in the number of operations over the previous year, not forgetting, however, that the level from which it was based was the lowest in the series.

Domestic prices maintain the downward trend started in the second quarter of 2008, also are maintained in the equalization of prices between new and used housing.

manteniene In Castellon downward trend in prices of old housing, although the difference with new housing has been reduced by the sharp decline in the first quarter this 2009, the last two quarters have seen a spike in the price per square meter of new housing compared to previous quarters, although annual rates still remain negative, so that it can not yet speak of an upward trend of these prices.

Although prices began to moderate in a clear from the first quarter of 2006 (the year in which there was a steep drop in home sales transactions, especially in Castellón), the drop in prices per square meter does not occur until the first quarter 2008 in Castellón and to the room where the whole of Spain, the last-year data show what appears a clear change in trend (faster in Castellón), although with declining prices per square meter.

With this update of the data we can continue with this series, whose next installment will deal, as announced in October, on the labor market.

To finish with the first two installments over this update, mentioning that the data used until now in full from the National Institute of Statistics (in its series Statistical Transmissions Property Rights, whose primary source is the College's Registrar Property, Commercial and Personal Property in Spain, and its series Construction Statistics, subseries Housing Prices, whose primary source is the General Directorate for Economic Development Ministerior).

How Long To Takes To Results With Zumba

level: next disaster, war

ultra-liberal media reacted to the debacle fraudulent blaming the financial system States not really know why, given the abject failure of deregulation of markets (deregulated markets were mixed derivatives, financial products, those who managed to hide and globalize subprime mortgages), which not forget that is the foundation upon which rests the economic ultra-liberalism (the State only be limited to ensuring an independent judiciary, the rest of society in the hands of the supposedly more efficient markets), urgent need to save all the ultra-liberal economic theory devalued and to be responsible for the failure to find markets outside their own markets. And you certainly are trying.

The most absurd and pathetic assumptions are welcomed, provided that affect the right direction, "blaming others for the catastrophic crisis that affects us all-as a belief in the ultra-liberal media, who do not hesitate to raise category of expert shamans gurus to mere shoddy, the main argument ultraliberal (widespread and accepted by these economic theories) blames a leftist government (although it would have much to qualify in this regard) have intervened in the markets and have been, Thus, the main responsible for the international financial crisis. How? For the truth is that in a so convoluted that some fanatical anyone would cost a lot to get an idea of \u200b\u200bhow Clinton was responsible for the biggest financial scam of all history of capitalism: to relax the conditions of access to a mortgage.

I also think that Clinton was wrong, but not intervene in the markets (as he did was to deregulate, the opposite to intervene, by allowing the financial sector into a sector which until then was vetoed), but not following that deregulation with more control, leaving to the discretion of immeasurable greed of the capitalist system, however, it is clear that deregulation was not which later created the financial crisis (just wanted a byproduct of those subprime mortgages, clearly identified and ranked very high risk), but the subsequent adaptation of a formula which provided (almost automatically) the credit rating of product mix financial risks were composed of completely disparate (simplified formula how you could rate the risk of a mixture of a reliable product, such as government bonds, with a high risk product, such as subprime mortgages, "the so that the resulting product obtained medium risk) and that went on sale in markets without any regulation (Paradise of ultra-liberalism).

But far from being limited to such twisted theories like (considering social intervention which has always been a deregulation in line with liberal economic theory), each day is in some ultra-liberal press is beating new article previous ones, taking advantage of any conference or summer school for hyperactive ultra-liberal organizations, the latter has appeared today in Digital Freedom under the suggestive title " Marc Faber:" The central banks, not markets, are outside control " '. The intro of the article says that " the prestigious investor Marc Faber insists that the crisis will lead to military tensions and hyperinflationary because central bank," and inside the article (which is actually an interview) we can guess that to regard this prestigious investor is World War III with China (because " China has a long border with several countries ) and Japan (because" Japan's relations with the United States have deterioriado ) facing the U.S. (and the Western world in general), but the best is the recommendation made by the expert : Investing in Asia, which is just the market in which he operates and who is an expert investor. Has missed only leave your phone number and your bank account to provide consulting services to anyone who wants to follow his advice.

seems that the doomsayers have secured a long term work in the ultra-liberal press, Nostradamus would be a consultant billionaire if he had lived in times of crisis like this.